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Rustock Revisited

 

March 5, 2009

Anyone looking at our spambot data will notice that Rustock is again back among the spamming botnet leaders, despite being hampered for a time following the McColo takedown last November. Since then it has been a roller coaster ride for Rustock but it is now gaining momentum. Rustock spamming activity is currently responsible for 35% of spam received in our spam traps. Given its prominence, we thought it would be timely to revisit this beast to highlight some of its characteristics. 

 


Figure 1: Spambot percentage breakdown as of March 5, 2009.
 
Figure 2: The red line in the graph representing Rustock's "Roller-coaster" spamming activity.

 

A couple of weeks after the McColo takedown, the Rustock botnet came back and started contacting its control server at a different host. Rustock bots have Command and Control (C&C) domain names hardcoded in the malware body, so that the malware authors can change the control host dynamically.

 Figure 3: Capture showing Rustock logging in to 91.212.45.10
 
Here are some domain names found in Rustock samples we have examined:
  • onlinescannow.com
  • protectionforless.com
  • guardandprotector.com
  • piecefordesktop.com
  • lekatariba.info
  • ekbad.me
  • mordva2009aa.info
  • belarus2014in.com
  • moscow1766bc.me


Due to the stealth of this malware, perhaps the most obvious symptom of a Rustock infected computer is the high SMTP Port 25 activity. However, if you use special tools like GMER , TCPView and Wireshark it reveals more detailed Rustock activity. Here are some illustrations:

1. Rustock injects its code into the services.exe process. Using TCPView, we can see services.exe performing a suspicious HTTP connection.


Figure 4
 

2. Rustock also employs complex rootkit capability. GMER exposes the rootkit driver dropped by this malware. The filename format is usually an eight random character .SYS file.


Figure 5

 

3. Capturing the network packets, you will also notice a suspicious POST request.

Figure 6: Requesting to login to a control server

Figure 7: Retrieving data from a control server

 

The spamming templates are dynamic and change often.  However, most of the time, the URL links in the message body have a particular Chinese domain format that point to a Canadian Pharmacy website. 
 

Figure 8: Viewing the HTML source code of the message body reveals link pointing to a Chinese domain website.

 

Rustock is one of the fastest spambots we have observed (~25,000 spam per hour/bot) and employs a complex rootkit capability enabling it to stay hidden on the computer. Its perhaps no surprise that this botnet is taking the lead again amongst the major spammers.

Last Reviewed: March 6, 2009 by Rodel Mendrez